3 comity toward foreign judgments and enforcing arbitral awards. The proper balancing of these policies depends in large measure on one's conclusions about the nature of commitments to resolve crossborder commercial disputes through arbitration.
Like prisms, these French and American cases help to refract the interaction of three overlapping legal orders: national statutes, international law and privatized dispute resolution. While lending itself to few elegant dogmas, analysis of award annulment offers insights into how these legal systems interact, and suggests two modest conclusions.
First, courts should defer to annulments that are consistent with procedural fairness and international public policy. Such deference follows not from any explicit treaty mandate, but from the parties' mutual commitments. Merchants who contract for an arbitral situs should be held to the implicit consequences of the bargain, whether this means narrow or broad judicial scrutiny. If the chosen review standards appear problematic on post-dispute reflection, market forces will direct future arbitrations elsewhere. Although this approach occasionally will be inconvenient for some business managers, it provides a better balance of social and economic consequences than other realistic alternatives.
Second, countries that host international arbitration should maintain their traditional role in monitoring the fairness of proceedings conducted within their borders. At the same time, these national legal systems should seek to limit the type of intrusive review procedures that invite disregard of annulments. To this end, the United States should adopt a separate statutory regime for international commercial arbitration, embodying more laissez-faire review than might apply to purely domestic cases. 179 . 11 The order of the Nanterre Tribunal de Grande Instance, which recognized the second award (as well as the Swiss court's annulment of the first award), was confirmed by the Versailles Cour d'Appel, 29 June 1995 , 1995 . ARB. 639. 12 10 June 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 376. 13 See Cour de cassation decision affirming the lower court's recognition of the annulled award, 1994 REV. ARB. 327 (stating that the Geneva award "n'était pas intégrée à l'ordre juridique de [ 
(LDIP). Upheld by the Swiss

la Suisse]").
14 See NCPC art. 1502. See also Bruno Leurent, Société Procédés de préfabrication pour le béton v. Libye, 1998 REV. ARB. 399, 407. Commenting on a court's refusal to monitor arbitration conducted in France because its official seat was Geneva, Leurent notes the inconsistency of giving significance to the arbitral seat in that case while assuming that the Hilmarton award was not integrated 6 In France both awards were recognized, each in a separate proceeding: first the annulled decision in favor of the defendant; 10 then the award in the second arbitration in favor of the claimant.
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Ultimately the Cour de Cassation held that the first judgment, recognizing the annulled decision, prevented recognition of the second arbitral award.
12
The position of the Cour de Cassation on res judicata is understandable. However, its enforcement of the vacated award is less so. The court's reasoning that international arbitrations are not integrated into the legal order of the arbitral situs 13 is hardly consistent with the fact that French judges annul awards in international arbitrations conducted in France. 14 results and the consequent offence to international comity"). While respectful of the judiciary at the arbitral situs, the deferral of enforcement in Europcar is not the same as the deference to the foreign court in Baker Marine. An American judge might merely want the benefit of the foreign court's findings. 21 939 F.Supp 910. The court referred to Convention Article VII, which provides that the Convention shall not "deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied on." See text at note 40. The Second Circuit in Baker Marine, supra note 20, rejected this argument by noting that "[n]othing suggests that the parties intended United States domestic arbitral law to govern their dispute." 191 F. 3d 194. 22 On "manifest disregard," see note 100. On review of choice-of-law methodology, see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman, 514 U.S. 52 (1995) , which interprets the proper scope of a New 8 apply the correct law, a non-waivable ground for annulment in Egypt. 18 Despite the annulment, a U.S. federal court ordered enforcement of the award against the defendant's American assets. 19 In an opinion with neither precedent nor progeny, 20 the court reasoned that since the Federal Arbitration Act does not list error of law as a ground for vacatur, the claimant "maintains all rights [to award enforcement] that it would have in the absence of the Convention."
21
Two aspects of the federal court's controversial reasoning deserve special mention. First, the Egyptian practice of annulling erroneous awards does not differ significantly from the way American courts vacate awards for "manifest disregard of the law" or improper choice-of-law reasoning.
22
York choice selection clause.
23 Chromalloy looked to 9 U.S.C. §10 in Chapter I of the Federal Arbitration Act, which applies to domestic awards. However, foreign awards are subject to Chapter II, which gives Chapter I residual effect only if not inconsistent with Chapter II. See 9 U.S.C. §208. 24 See International Standard Electric Corporation v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y Commercial, 745 F.Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act did not allow vacatur of an award rendered in Mexico even if the merits of the dispute were to be decided under New York law). 25 In theory, parties might stipulate that an arbitration will be conducted in one country subject to the procedural law of another. New York Convention Article V(1)(e) speaks of awards set aside by a competent authority "of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made" (emphasis added). Thus two Israelis might elect to arbitrate in New York subject to the arbitration law of Israel. In such rare situations, however, it would create unnecessary conflict if Israeli courts were to attempt to vacate the resulting award, since courts in New York might also set aside a local award that violated the mandatory American norms. (1998) . 29 The reality of litigation bias may be less significant than the perception that such prejudice exists. In federal civil actions in the United States, foreigners actually fare better than domestic parties, perhaps because fear of bias causes foreigners to continue to judgment only with particularly strong cases. 30 Greater risks require greater returns. To illustrate, imagine two potential investments, one in Country A presenting an opportunity for a large profit, but with a good chance that local courts will be biased against a foreign party, and another in Country B yielding a smaller profit, but with fair dispute resolution. Depending on how large the disparity between the expected returns, many risk-averse foreign merchants will choose the lower return coupled with the fairer legal system. See generally William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation, 12 (No. 4) J. INT'L ARB. 99 (1995) . 31 Commercial actors are unlikely to retain confidence in a dispute resolution system allowing arbitrators to roll dice, flip coins or consult the entrails of disemboweled poultry. Nor do business managers expect arbitrators to deny one side the opportunity to present its case, or to decide issues never submitted to them. 32 (1997) (making the distinction between passive waiting for an opponent to seek award enforcement and active challenge to an award immediately after it is made).
11
at increased prices to cover the risk of biased adjudication.
30
The second goal of efficient arbitration, community confidence that aberrant decisions will not be enforced, implicates judicial scrutiny of an arbitration's basic procedural fairness. 31 Fidelity to the parties' shared expectations in this regard is as important as speed and economy.
Courts monitor the arbitral process in two distinct modes, depending on whether the reviewing forum has jurisdiction over the parties' assets or serves only as a convenient arbitral situs. 32 In the latter case, review occurs before any attempt to enforce the arbitrator's decision, as courts simply pronounce an award void upon a motion to vacate, or valid upon a motion to confirm. By contrast, enforcement actions call for more dramatic judicial behavior, typically attachment of property or refusal to hear a claim allegedly covered by the arbitrator's decision.
In domestic transactions the distinction between these two types of review will rarely be 12 important, since both occur in the same legal system, often pursuant to simultaneous motions to confirm and to vacate. In cross-border disputes, however, pre-enforcement scrutiny and enforcement actions can occur in different countries. Understanding the interaction of these two jurisdictions requires a brief look at the New York Convention.
B. The New York Convention
Framework
The New York Convention operates on two levels to promote the international currency of commitments to arbitrate. First, the Convention requires deference to valid arbitration 33 Convention Article II(3) requires national courts to "refer parties to arbitration" in respect of matters covered by an agreement to arbitrate. 34 Although its principal focus is on foreign awards (i.e., awards rendered in a country other than the one where enforcement is sought), the Convention also covers awards "not considered as domestic." This latter category includes awards arising from disputes that directly implicate international commerce. See Lander Co. v. MMP, Invs., 107 F.3d 476 (1997) 33 Second, courts must enforce foreign awards 34 as they would domestic ones.
35
Award recognition, however, is subject to several defenses. One group furthers the loser's right to a fair arbitration, by allowing courts to reject awards tainted with excess of authority and procedural irregularity. 36 Another set of defenses protects the forum's own interest in withholding support for awards that deal with non-arbitrable subjects or violate public policy.
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The Convention's effectiveness depends largely on each country's national arbitration law.
UNCITRAL Model Law). See generally HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEWHAUS, GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1989).
39 Convention art. II(3). In the United States the validity of arbitration clauses is generally determined by state law principles governing contract formation. See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) . Only rarely does one find invocation of supra-national standards for the validity of arbitration agreements. See Rhone Mediterranée v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1983) (referring to an "internationally recognized defense such as duress, mistake, fraud or waiver"). See also Municipalité de El Magreb v. Dalico, Cour de Cassation (France), 1994 REV. ARB. 116, 117 (holding that the existence of an international arbitration clause is determined without reference to national law ("sans qu'il soit nécessaire de se référer à une loi étatique")). 40 See Convention art. VII, quoted in note 21.
41 NCPC, art. 1498. 42 NCPC Article 1502 permits appeal of recognition orders for (i) lack of a valid arbitration agreement, (ii) irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal, (iii) excess of authority, (iv) failure to respect due process (principe de la contradiction) and (v) violation of international public policy.
14 Arbitration agreements must be enforced if not "null and void," essentially a notion of local contract principles. 39 More significantly, the Convention says nothing about proper or improper annulment standards, but leaves each country free to establish its own grounds for vacating awards made within its territory.
The Convention will not deprive interested parties of the right to rely on awards to the extent allowed by an enforcement forum's own law. 40 Therefore the structure of national arbitration law becomes significant. For example, the French arbitration decree relevant in Hilmarton requires courts to recognize foreign awards unless contrary to international public policy, 41 and permits appeal of recognition orders only on limited grounds that do not include annulment. 45 The French text provides that "recognition and enforcement will not be refused unless the award . . . was annulled where rendered" (La reconnaissance et l ' 99 (1996) . 16 with the permissive English. 46 Some scholars argue that under the Convention annulment triggers a universal effect, making an award unenforceable in all places where presented for enforcement. 47 According to one view, the Convention contains an implicit understanding that the arbitral situs will monitor an arbitration's procedural integrity, in exchange for which other countries will recognize awards that pass muster where rendered. 48 This power to uproot an arbitrator's decision would mean that the place of arbitration could invalidate a defective award once and for all. 49 Other commentators read the Convention as allowing enforcement courts discretion in dealing with annulled awards. 
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The United Nations Economic and Social Council, however, rejected broad notions of autonomous "international" awards, in favor of simply making "foreign" awards more transportable from one country to another. 55 The middle course eventually taken in drafting the New York Convention was one that reduced, but did not eliminate, the role of the arbitral situs. Confirmation at the place of arbitration is no longer necessary, but enforcement of vacated awards may be refused. One consequence of this compromise has been uncertainty about the fate of annulled awards. Article V(2) also uses the very same permissive language (recognition "may be refused") with respect to public policy violations, which almost by definition make awards unenforceable, notwithstanding recourse to local courts in circumscribing the relevant policies. 58 See European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Geneva, 21 Apr. 1961, art. 9, 484 U.N.T.S. 349, which was adopted to supplement the New York Convention among residents of member states. For support of this position, see Paulsson at note 7.
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(awards "shall" be recognized) and the permissive language of Article V (annulled awards "may" be refused recognition).
A more energetic reading suggests that the Convention contemplates comity regarding foreign judgments. Stating that enforcement may be refused affirms a positive norm (as in "one may worship as conscience dictates") rather than a value-neutral choice (as in "one may order either chocolate or vanilla"). Supporting this view is the fact that Article V(1)(e) is nestled among defects that clearly make awards unenforceable, such as void arbitration agreements, lack of due process and excess of authority. 60 For instance, requiring that all arbitrators sign awards (a standard abolished by Austria in 1983) gives dissenting arbitrators a tool to sabotage the arbitration. 61 In some cases, of course, biased behavior and manifest disregard of the law might be characterized as conduct outside the arbitrator's jurisdiction. 62 For example, London courts that hear appeals on points of English law (allowed by 1996 Arbitration Act unless the parties agree otherwise) promote the development of a legal system on which many business managers rely. 63 Some litigants, for example, might see judicial review as enhancing predictability in contract interpretation. 64 On the distinction between error of law and excess of authority, see notes 100 & 102. 67 See Convention Articles III and V, discussed in text corresponding to notes 34-37. 68 Factors relevant to comity include the absence of fraud, public policy violations and conflict with a prior judgment or forum selection agreement, as well as the foreign court's impartiality, jurisdiction and granting of due process and proper notice. recognize French judgment on the assumption that French courts did not recognize American judgments, but stating that the merits of a foreign judgment should not otherwise be tried again when there has been "opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction . . . and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court . . . or fraud in procuring the judgment").
21
To end litigation in a way that promotes efficient cross-border economic relationships, many developed legal systems enforce foreign judgments either pursuant to treaty 65 or as a matter of discretionary comity. 66 In much the same way that courts enforce arbitral awards without examining their merits, 67 principles of comity call for recognition of foreign judgments on condition that there be no serious procedural irregularity or violation of public policy.
68
The soundest policy toward annulment orders is to treat them like other foreign money 69 The functional similarity between annulments and other money judgments can be illustrated by a contract interpreted under English law by a London court resulting in a judgment that "Defendant owes nothing to Claimant." Had the contract provided for arbitration in London subject to appeal on points of English law, the same conclusion would have been expressed by annulment of an arbitrator's erroneous award for claimant. 70 (1997) . The virtue of this approach is that it points toward the heart of the annulment problem: aberrant judicial behavior. Its drawback is that courts must look at an arbitration's substantive merits. For a methodology that weighs multiple factors (grounds for vacatur, party intentions, enforcement forum policies, the need for uniformity and a presumption favoring foreign judgment recognition), see Stephen Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Chromalloy: United States Law and International Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650 (1998) . 72 See discussion in text at nots 78-90. 22 judgments, according them deference unless procedurally unfair or contrary to fundamental notions of justice. 69 While controversial annulments will arouse the same type of resistance as other problematic judgments, 70 there is no reason that these cases cannot be disposed of within comity's flexible framework.
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As an aspirational model, the extension of comity to foreign judgments holds both parties to the consequences implicit in selecting one arbitral situs rather than another. 72 This can be of particular importance when annulment is followed by a second arbitration yielding a decision different from the 73 Contrast French and English decisions in Hilmarton, discussed in notes 7 & 15 and corresponding text 74 In some cases, of course, vacated award will be refused enforcement even without comity, due to overlapping grounds for annulment and non-recognition. For example, if arbitrators in New York disregard their mission, the award could be vacated under §10 of the Federal Arbitration Act; the excess of jurisdiction would also impair recognition in Paris under both NCPC Article 1502 and New York Convention Article V. 75 Named for the 16th century British financier, the original Gresham's law observed that "bad money drives out good." If two coins have equal nominal value but different metal contents, the one with less precious metal remains in circulation. 76 A different rule would normally obtain in federal systems. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (interpreting the "full faith and credit" clause in Constitution Article IX).
first.
73 Unless vacatur triggers non-recognition, 74 the annulled award might receive res judicata effect at the place where property is located, creating a Gresham's Law of awards in which bad decisions drive out good ones. 75 Such a "first-come-first-served" rule legitimizes a race to the courthouse likely to be won by the party relying on the earlier (annulled) award. The infrequency of such conflicts, like the rarity of arbitrator corruption, does not mean they can be ignored.
If only good faith judgments will be recognized, unflattering comparisons among legal systems will sometimes be made. Yet it is difficult to see a better alternative in a heterogeneous world lacking shared traditions of judicial independence. While injustice sometimes results when a court sets aside an award against a local party (as in Chromalloy), this danger can be minimized through the choice of a disinterested arbitral venue with limited review standards. Indeed, the arbitral venue is the one place subject to party control. Careful contract drafting permits selection of an arbitral seat in which neither side has an inside track to the courts. By contrast, the enforcement situs will often be the losing side's home country. After a CIETAC arbitration in Beijing, the losing party was deemed to have waived its right to resist enforcement of the award in England, due to an unreasonable failure to present its case in an arbitration resumed after its initial stages. Mr. Justice Coleman wrote, "Ferco had not been unable to present its case. On the contrary ... its counsel had simply failed to take that opportunity." Id. at 327. His opinion continued with the dictum:
In international commerce a party who contracts into an agreement to arbitrate in a foreign jurisdiction is bound ... by the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts of the seat of the arbitration. If the award is defective or the arbitration is defectively conducted the party who complains of the defect must int he first instance pursue such remedies as exist under that supervisory jurisdiction. That is because by his agreement to the place in question as the seat of arbitration he has agreed not only to refer all disputes to arbitration but that the conduct o the arbitration should be subject to that particular supervisory jurisdiction. Id. at 330-31. Comment by Hong-lin Yu, 65 ARBITRATION 195 (1999) , [1999] INT'L A.L.R. 83. 82 See, e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, art. 28(6) (award "binding"); LCIA Rules, §26.9 (award "final and binding"); AAA International Arbitration Rules, art. 27(1) (award "final and binding"); 25 which must be interpreted in a way that neither ignores nor distorts the others. 79 In addition to agreeing to settle disputes privately, the parties commit themselves to a specific arbitral venue, selected by them either directly or through their chosen arbitral institution. 80 Inherent in the understanding about situs is an expectation that proceedings will be subject to that country's mandatory procedural safeguards.
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Arbitration rules and contract stipulations providing that awards will be "final and binding" 82 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 32(2) (award "final and binding"). 83 See, e.g., M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that waiver provisions in the ICC Rules "merely reflect a contractual intent that the issues joined and resolved in the arbitration may not be tried de novo in any court" (quoting Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1992))), stay denied, 935 F. Supp. 910 (1996) Cir. 1997) . The 1996 English Arbitration Act allows pre-dispute waiver of appeal on points of law ( §69), but not waiver of challenge for serious procedural irregularity or excess of jurisdiction ( § §67-68). 84 For analysis of when and why the law restrains people from reneging on commitments, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS (1998 (1998) ("the presumed intention of the parties [is] that all aspects of the merits of their dispute should be decided by their chosen tribunal and not by the court"); Jan Paulsson, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment, 9 ICC BULL. 14, 25 (May 1998), (labeling as "mythical" parties who seek merits review through choice of arbitral situs). 26 must be read against the background of the arbitration's legal framework. In this context, "finality" means "finality as allowed under relevant arbitration laws," which in some countries subject awards to mandatory judicial control mechanisms. 83 Moreover, in a world where most legal systems do not impose merits review, the choice of an arbitral seat that does monitor an arbitrator's legal error argues for an intent to select a level of judicial scrutiny different from what is available elsewhere.
Ignoring the implications of the parties' direct or indirect choice of situs permits one side to change its mind about judicial review after seeing who gets the rough edge of the bargain. 84 While many arbitration lawyers favor limited court scrutiny, 85 some business managers opt for a judicial safety 87 In addition to the form of judicial review, choice of an arbitral seat implicates court selection of the arbitrators in the event of party default. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law art. 11(3); English Arbitration Act §18; Federal Arbitration Act §5; Swiss LDIP art. 179; French NCPC arts. 1454, 1455. 88 On the relationship between fairness and the parties' "veil of ignorance," see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §24, at 136 (1971) . 89 In one well known case, the business managers agreed to the ICC Arbitration Rules (which provide for waiver of appeal) while at the same time stipulating to appeal on the legal and factual merits of the case. See Lapine v. Kyocera, 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997). 93 Two principal models have emerged for review of awards at the arbitral seat. The most popular gives losers a right to challenge 94 In some cases duly appointed arbitrators may overreach their mandates. In other cases, absent a valid a arbitration clause covering the controverted event, the excess of authority may be that of an unauthorized meddler. 95 See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act §10; French NCPC art. 1502; Swiss LDIP art. 190; UNCITRAL Model Law art. 34. While these last three statutes do not enumerate bias explicitly, other bases for vacatur could serve to deal with this defect. For example LDIP includes in its list of award defects both unequal treatment of the parties (art. 190(2)(d)) and violation of public policy (art. 190(2)(e)). 96 (1997) (suggesting that mistakes of law can constitute excess of authority). See also Inter-City Gas v. Boise Cascade, 845 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1988). In England, Lord Denning reversed otherwise unappealable decisions by reasoning that since judges are not authorized to make mistakes, in so doing they exceed their power. See DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW 74 (1979) ("Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void."). See also Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736, 743 (C.A.) ("The distinction between an error which entails absence of jurisdiction and an error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . . that it is rapidly being eroded.").
"arbitrariness,"
101 implying something beyond a simple mistake but not necessarily clear excess of authority.
In assessing a national legal system, the winner will look for finality, while the loser will want careful judicial consideration of questionable aspects of the decision. Although no system will reconcile perfectly these rival goals, a middle ground can provide judicial review for the grosser forms of procedural injustice.
The text of the law, of course, must be read in the context of its application. Even a statute that limits judicial review to procedural irregularity may allow wiggle room for an overzealous judge to examine a dispute's legal merits under the guise of correcting an arbitrator's excess of authority. While court scrutiny incident to award enforcement is uncontroversial (judges can hardly attach assets without first examining the piece of paper to be enforced), it is less obvious why there should be review before a motion is made to recognize an award, at least when the arbitration involves neither property nor activity at the arbitral situs. In this context, concern for the independence of international dispute resolution has led one of France's leading arbitration scholars to suggest complete elimination of pre-enforcement judicial review.
radical nature by observing, "That which is most bizarre is not necessarily most illogical" (La plus saugrenue n'est pas la plus illogique.). Id. at 351. For an earlier incarnation of his views on the subject, see PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 22-23 (1964) , in which he urges that particularities of national norms and conflict-of-laws rules should no longer play any role in international arbitration.
106 Convention Article V(1)(e) permits non-recognition of an award set aside where "made," which will normally be the designated seat of proceedings, notwithstanding the place of signature or location of hearings. However, in Hiscox v. Outhwaite, [1991] A.E.R. 641, an award signed in Paris was considered made in France although the arbitral seat for purposes of appeal remained in England. The result would be different under England's 1996 Arbitration Act.
34
Although conceptually and administratively simple, the elimination of all pre-enforcement judicial review would be unwise. As discussed below, the absence of any court scrutiny at the arbitral situs would adversely affect both the victims of defective arbitrations and the interests of the reviewing state itself.
Efficiency
By serving as the seat of an arbitration, a nation vests an award with presumptive validity under the New York Convention, thereby granting arbitrators power to create legal consequences throughout the world. Such support of the arbitral process arguably carries with it a duty to vacate biased or capricious decisions so that victims of irregularity may better resist defective awards.
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Even in a world without the New York Convention, judicial review at the arbitral situs makes sense as an efficient way to control aberrant arbitral behavior, increasing the commercial community's confidence that arbitration will not be a lottery of erratic results. Court scrutiny relatively soon after the proceedings permits the creation of a record when documents and witnesses are still available and before recollections become stale.
Fertilization of Local Law
Where local law governs the interpretation of a contract, one school of thought supports mandatory judicial review as a way to fertilize the development of the forum's substantive legal principles. The assumption is that court cases create precedents that provide behavioral rules to guide the conduct of business outside a particular dispute. 114 For this reason England once restricted waivers of appeal on points of English law in admiralty, commodities and insurance arbitrations (where English law enjoys a certain preeminence), 115 which permitted these areas of the law to be fertilized with 37 judgments covering modern commercial controversies.
As England was abolishing the right of appeal in these "special category" disputes, securities arbitration in the United States was illustrating the need for such safeguards. Since the U. S. Supreme
Court upheld the arbitrability of customer claims against brokerage houses, 116 there has been a decided decrease in court decisions dealing with broker-customer relations, and a resulting freeze in the relevant law. 117 The crippling effect on legal development is particularly worrisome with respect to domestic were not clear about their coverage. 128 Grounds for vacatur might be patterned on those of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 129 but with several modifications. First, arbitrator bias and corruption should be included explicitly as grounds for annulment. 130 Second, no reference should be made to "public policy," a chameleon-like concept that risks misapplication when refracted through parochial cultural lenses. 131 Finally, parties might be given the more circumscribed nature of these procedural defects make them less likely to cause mischief. The statute should also codify basic notions of arbitration procedure now hidden in a maze of often inconsistent cases that delight those wishing to sabotage an arbitration. In particular, the statute should allow arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction as a preliminary matter, and should confirm that arbitration clauses remain effective notwithstanding the invalidity of other contract provisions. 132 Other areas in need of clarification include the interaction of federal and state arbitration law, 133 pre-award attachment, 134 consolidation of proceedings, 135 the validity of attempts to expand judicial review by international if the parties' places of business are in different states or the transaction has a connection to a state other than the parties' places of business. In addition, the Model Law allows parties to opt to treat their agreement as international. 142 The statute might cover disputes of a pecuniary nature unless entirely among American residents. Corporations and partnerships would be considered U.S. residents if organized under American law, or if they have a principal place of business in the United States. A U.S. branch of a foreign corporation would be considered a U.S resident. An individual would be considered a resident if physically present in the United States more than 183 days during any calendar year. 143 See, e.g., Klaus-Peter Berger, The Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany, 13 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 38, 39 (Jan. 1998).
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As between these approaches, 141 a residence-based test seems more sensible. 142 The special status of international arbitration justifies itself as a way to promote neutrality in dispute resolution among commercial actors from different countries. Difficult linguistic and procedural issues are more likely to arise when Boston merchants sue buyers in Beijing or Cairo than when they bring litigation in
Chicago against an American supplier of goods destined for export.
Conclusion
Constructing an efficient framework for arbitration requires legislators and courts to engage in a process of legal fine tuning that balances a winner's concern for finality against a loser's desire for procedural safeguards. While a golden mean will remain elusive, national arbitration law can seek a reasonable counterpoise between arbitral autonomy and judicial control mechanisms.
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To this end, the United States should adopt an international arbitration act making clear that the protective review standards appropriate for domestic disputes will not affect cross-border arbitration.
This statute should also clarify, with respect to international commercial disputes, critical issues such as 144 One is reminded of Justice Holmes's comment that "[t]he most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground for interference is very Not all nations, however, follow this ideal. Weighing arbitration's costs and benefits differently, some countries impose court scrutiny of a dispute's legal merits, while others allow waiver of all preenforcement review. If business managers choose to arbitrate in such jurisdictions, there is no reason to disregard the implications of these choices in an attempt to squeeze the entire world into the same Procrustean arbitral mold. Should commercial actors find a country's review standards burdensome or inadequate, the market will direct their next arbitration to a place more compatible with the desired level of judicial control.
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Recognition of vacated awards should depend not on the nature of the annulment standard, but on whether the annulment was made in good faith and comports with fundamental notions of justice.
The touchstone for deference to court judgments about arbitration, as to arbitral awards themselves, lies in the absence of fraud and undue influence, and conformity with basic notions of international public policy.
